Document

TS001-1.0.4 LoRaWAN® L2 1.0.4 Specification

Issue link: https://read.uberflip.com/i/1428395

Contents of this Issue

Navigation

Page 42 of 89

LoRaWAN ® L2 1.0.4 Specification © 2020 LoRa Alliance ® Page 43 of 90 The authors reserve the right to change specifications without notice. Private/experimental network reserved AddrPrefix N = 7 AddrPrefix = 7'b0000000 or AddrPrefix = 7'b0000001 NwkAddr = 25-bit range freely allocated by a Network Server Table 52: AddrPrefix values available for use by private/experimental networks 1358 1359 1360 Please refer to [TS002] for the exact construction of the AddrPrefix field and the definition 1361 of the various address classes. 1362 6.1.2 Network session key (NwkSKey) 1363 NwkSKey is a network session key specific to the end-device. It is used by both the Network 1364 Server and the end-device to calculate and verify the MIC (message integrity code) of all data 1365 frames to ensure data integrity. It is further used to encrypt and decrypt the payload field of 1366 MAC-only data frames, where FPort=0. 1367 NwkSKey SHOULD be stored such that extraction and re-use by malicious actors is 1368 prevented. 1369 6.1.3 Application session key (AppSKey) 1370 1371 AppSKey is an application session key specific to the end-device. It is used by both the 1372 Application Server and the end-device to encrypt and decrypt the payload field of application- 1373 specific data frames. Application payloads SHALL be encrypted end-to-end between the end- 1374 device and the Application Server, but they are integrity-protected only over-the-air and not 1375 end-to-end. This means that a Network Server may be able to alter the encrypted content of 1376 the data frames in transit (yet without being able to read the plain content). Network servers 1377 are considered to be trusted, but it is RECOMMENDED that applications wishing to implement 1378 end-to-end confidentiality and integrity protection use additional end-to-end security solutions, 1379 which are beyond the scope of this specification. 1380 AppSKey SHOULD be stored such that extraction and re-use by malicious actors is 1381 prevented. 1382 6.2 Over-the-Air Activation 1383 For over-the-air activation, end-devices SHALL follow a Join Procedure prior to participating 1384 in data exchanges with a Network Server. An end-device SHALL initiate a new Join Procedure 1385 every time it loses the session context information. 1386 An end-device SHALL be personalized with the following information before it starts the Join 1387 procedure: a globally unique end-device identifier (DevEUI), the Join Server identifier 1388 (JoinEUI), and an AES-128 key (AppKey). 1389 The JoinEUI is described below in Section 6.2.2. 1390 1391

Articles in this issue

view archives of Document - TS001-1.0.4 LoRaWAN® L2 1.0.4 Specification