Issue link: https://read.uberflip.com/i/1527093
LoRaWAN ® Relay Specification TS011-1.0.1 ©2024 LoRa Alliance ® Page 57 of 62 The authors reserve the right to change specifications without notice. • Denial of Service: The resources allocated to the malicious Join-Request may 1748 prevent the relay from serving concurrent legitimate requests. 1749 • Deprivation of Energy: The relay will spend energy serving the malicious Join- 1750 Requests, leading to its earlier death by energy deprivation (if energy constrained). 1751 This in turn leads to a deferred Denial of Service attack. 1752 • Hijacking of the relay for the attacker's personal use: If physical forwarding (a.k.a. 1753 impersonation) is used for the forwarding, the malicious Join-Requests are repeated, 1754 unchanged. The relays can therefore be abused by an attacker to forward proprietary 1755 messages, encoded into LoRaWAN Join-Request frames, between its own nodes. If 1756 encapsulation is used for forwarding, the forwarded malicious Join-Request is 1757 rendered opaque to the attacker by the relay-to-NS encryption. Therefore, the 1758 hijacking provides no benefit to the attacker (the relay should check the length of the 1759 Join-Request before forwarding it, so that the forwarded frame length cannot be 1760 exploited). 1761 1762 All of these attacks can be mitigated, but not eliminated, by filtering and rate limiting. 1763 • The relay should check that the frame to be forwarded is a Join-Request, as much as 1764 it can tell (header, length, etc,). 1765 • Filtering by DevEUI reduces the set of DevEUIs for which Join-Requests are 1766 forwarded. However, a brute force attack may discover (part of) that set. Filtering by 1767 DevEUI assumes that the relay is preconfigured to only accept a set of end-devices, 1768 which is a use case limitation. 1769 • Rate limiting per DevEUI is expensive to implement and not efficient if a wide range 1770 of forwarded DevEUIs is offered to the attacker. 1771 • Global rate limiting at the relay level is easy to implement but results in denial of 1772 service to legitimate Join-Requests. 1773 1774 Recommendation: The relay should do some sanity checking on the Join-Request before 1775 considering whether to forward it, thereby saving on the credits of the rate limiting function 1776 (see Section 8.8). 1777 D. New Links 1778 The new links are susceptible to jamming, as with any radio link. 1779 1780 The new links are shown in Figure 17, with the receive ends in red. 1781 1782 Figure 17: New radio links 1783 There are four new radio interfaces: 1784 • WOR link, end-device side 1785 • WOR link, relay side 1786 • LoRaWAN link between the end-device and relay, relay side 1787 • LoRaWAN link between the relay and gateways, relay side 1788
