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White Paper: Hidden Risks of UEFI Secure Boot—and How RelianceOne™ Offers a Stronger Security Foundation

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WHITE PAPER The Hidden Risk of UEFI Secure Boot mrcy.com 2 mrcy.com 2 UEFI SECURE BOOT – VERIFIED BOOT UEFI Secure Boot establishes a chain of trust by verifying that the bootloader, Linux kernel (when chain-loaded in EFI mode), and optionally kernel modules are individually signed and authenticated against enrolled keys. Each component is independently verified as the Intel CPU progresses through execution modes to reach a fully booted system. The system BIOS, bootloader, and Linux kernel must all be UEFI-compatible and signed with private keys, then verified against enrolled public keys. System administrators can enroll new keys as needed; however, an attacker with sufficient privileges can exploit this same mechanism to enroll malicious keys, allowing the system to boot attacker-signed components. Configuration Data Remains Unauthenticated UEFI Secure Boot only verifies signatures for executable boot components—it never validates configuration data, even when that data controls critical security features. Consequently, BIOS configuration settings, Linux initramfs contents, and kernel command-line parameters remain unauthenticated. An attacker can exploit this gap to subvert late-load security components by modifying early boot configuration data within the initramfs or disabling essential protections such as the IOMMU. UEFI Secure Boot is a security feature designed to prevent unauthorized software from loading during the boot process. Although it has been widely adopted in modern computing devices, it has proven to be vulnerable and prone to compromise. This white paper explores the problems with UEFI Secure Boot and compares it with the approach used by Mercury's RelianceOne™ Trusted Platform. Mercury's RelianceOne Trusted Platform provides customers with capabilities that go beyond the conventional definition of secure boot. What sets it apart is its unique approach to determining which boot components are authenticated, how that authentication occurs, and how it leverages secure boot to comprehensively strengthen the system's overall security posture. As the most widely adopted standard for secure and trusted boot today, UEFI Secure Boot provides a natural benchmark for demonstrating RelianceOne Trusted Platform's distinctive advantages and enhanced capabilities. The following sections examine the key similarities and differences between these two approaches, illustrating why RelianceOne Trusted Platform is uniquely tailored to address the rigorous threat models inherent to mission critical systems and U.S. Aerospace and Defense (A&D) environments. Measured Launch Environment (MLE) Boot loader Trusted Platform Measured Boot Trusted Platform Trusted Platform Linux BIOS Extends SRTM PCRs (0-15) Loads Multiboot modules into memory Initial load of the VMM Resets DRTM PCRs and invokes SENTER Extends PCR 18 with Trusted Platform VMM measurement SENDER stops all threads (soft reset) Extends PCR 17 with SINIT measurement Extends PCRs 18 and 19 with additional Multiboot Module measurement Unseals KEK if PCRs match original sealing state (0-15) and (17, 18) Requests unseal of KEK stored in TPM NVRAM Extends PCRs 17 and 18 with hash of KEK Decrypts MMs using KEK SINIT ACM

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