Issue link: https://read.uberflip.com/i/1527093
LoRaWAN ® Relay Specification TS011-1.0.1 ©2024 LoRa Alliance ® Page 58 of 62 The authors reserve the right to change specifications without notice. 1789 Jamming of the last one is no different than jamming an end-device in the current LoRaWAN 1790 architecture, except that more end-devices are affected. However, their number is limited. 1791 The other three interfaces are discussed in subsections below. 1792 1793 JAMMING OF THE WOR CHANNEL AT THE END-DEVICE 1794 Because the relay is meant to use end-device-class radio chips, the WOR link between the 1795 end-device and the relay uses one or two physical channels (frequency/data rate) only (see 1796 Section 3.2). 1797 1798 Compared to the wider range of frequencies and physical parameters made available to the 1799 link between an end-device and the network gateways, this leads to easier jamming by an 1800 attacker (e.g., continuous narrow-band signal). 1801 1802 This susceptibility to jamming is mitigated if two WOR channels are used, which comes at 1803 the expense of more energy consumed at the relay. This mitigation is only effective after the 1804 end-device has acquired the knowledge about the additional channel. 1805 1806 After the WOR channel(s) used by a relay have been discovered by an attacker, a jammer 1807 located close to or focused toward the end-device can easily disrupt the link from the relay to 1808 the end-device, thereby preventing the end-device from receiving the WOR ACK. 1809 1810 The consequences of the end-device being unable to receive the WOR ACK are: 1811 • The end-device will not acquire or maintain synchronization to the relay. Therefore, it 1812 will send unnecessarily long preambles in forthcoming transmissions. 1813 • The end-device will keep retrying to reach the relay, spending resources, and 1814 eventually fail to discover the existence of the relay. 1815 • The end-device may refrain from sending the forthcoming LoRaWAN uplink, thereby 1816 missing the opportunity to have the uplink received by the relay, and potentially also 1817 by a gateway. 1818 1819 This attack only disrupts the operation of one end-device. 1820 1821 Recommendation: Have the end-device send the Class A Uplink anyway from time to time, 1822 even when it has not received the WOR ACK. In the attack case described here, this 1823 mitigation may allow the Class A Uplink to be received and forwarded by the relay, and 1824 maybe even to be directly received by a gateway. This is allowed by this specification (see 1825 Section 3.4) and configurable by the NS into each end-device (see Section 10.2). 1826 1827 JAMMING OF THE WOR CHANNEL AT THE RELAY 1828 After the WOR channel(s) used by a relay have been discovered by an attacker, a jammer 1829 located close to or focused toward the relay can easily disrupt the link from the relay to the 1830 end-device, thereby preventing the relay from receiving the WOR Relay Join-Request or the 1831 WOR Relay Class A Uplink. 1832 1833 The consequences of the relay being unable to receive the WOR Relay Class A Uplink are: 1834 • The relay will not listen for the forthcoming Class A Uplink transmission of the end- 1835 device and therefore will not be able to forward it. 1836 • The end-device will not acquire or maintain synchronization to the relay. Therefore it 1837 will send unnecessarily long preambles in future transmissions. 1838 • The end-device will keep retrying to reach the relay, spending resources, and 1839 eventually failing to discover the existence of the relay. 1840
